University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Reviews

Faculty Scholarship

2000

If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public
Choice Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate
Kyle D. Logue

University of Michigan Law School, klogue@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/110

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Logue, Kyle D. "If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice Perspective on the
Tax Transition Debate." Review of When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition
Relief and Retroactivity, by D. Shaviro. U. Chi. L. Rev. 67, no. 4 (2000): 1507-33.

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ff Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can:
A Public Choice Perspective on the Tax
Thansition Debate

Kyle D. Loguet
When Rules Change:An Economic and PoliticalAnalysis of Transition
Relief and Retroactivity. Daniel Shaviro. University of Chicago Press,

2000. Pp xiii, 253.
INTRODUCTION

It is a truism that changes in government policy can produce los
ers and winners. And nowhere is that truism more clearly revealed, or
more closely studied, than in the context of tax rule changes. Consider
the individual who makes an investment in real estate or business

equipment or some sort of financial instrument (such as stocks or
bonds) or even in human capital, and who does so in reliance on a

special tax deduction or credit which applies to that investment. If the
relied-upon tax preference is unexpectedly repealed, the investor may
suffer what is sometimes called a "transition loss," a decline in the

value of the pretransition investment.

The story can just as easily go the other way:

makes an investment

if

an individual

before the enactment of the special deduction or

credit (and oblivious to the possibility of its enactment), she may en

joy a windfall "transition gain" when the new rule is unexpectedly

adopted. And both effects-transition losses and gains-can result
from any number of tax rule changes (including changes in the tax

base as well as in tax rates) as well as from non-tax-law policy changes
of every variety, ranging from developments in common law tort doc
trine to changes in environmental laws or regulations to changes in
government spending programs.

That unexpected rule changes produce losers and winners is un
controversial. Disagreement arises over the question of what,

if any 

thing, should be done about these transition effects. To put the ques
tion slightly differently, what should our "transition policy " be? Or put
differently still, to what extent should the government deliberately try
to alleviate the "retroactive"1 effects of rule changes?
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful for comments re
ceived from Steve Croley, Saul Levmore, and Daniel Shaviro. All remaining errors are my own.
I
The concept of retroactivity can be defined in many different ways, and the definition
1507
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However you put it, the question has spawned a substantial litera
ture, which can be understood as having developed in three general
phases (pp 2-3). Phase one was the "old view" scholarship, which re
lied on general fairness concerns to argue against uncompensated ret

roactive rule changes. In phase two, applying the assumptions and
methods of modern economics (and the policy goal of social welfare
maximization), "new view" scholars offered a decidedly more favor
able take on retroactivity, and hence less favorable view of transition
relief. Phase three marked something of a revival of the old view (or a
reaction to the new view) in which scholars mounted welfarist (social

welfare maximization) defenses of transition relief in certain contexts.
In addition, and somewhat separately, a number of tax policy scholars

have for years encouraged the use of retroactive taxation precisely

cause

be

such taxes have the capacity to surprise investors and thus to

raise revenue without distorting incentives.
And now Professor Daniel Shaviro, building on the new view ap

proach but adding his own distinctive spin, has written what will likely

be considered the definitive study of legal transitions from the utili
tarian or welfarist perspective,2 and perhaps from any perspective. In

When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition
Relief and Retroactivity, Shaviro takes the various strands of the ex

isting literature on retioactivity and weaves them together, applying

his unique combination of legal expertise, political pragmatism, and
theoretical sophistication in public finance economics as well as politi
cal science. The result is a subtle, balanced, and scholarly treatise on
transition relief and retroactivity that should serve as the starting
point for all future research in the field.

In its stated objectives, the book is admirably ambitious. As

Shaviro puts it in the introduction,
This book seeks to reframe the scholarly transition debate, and
possibly even influence political practice, through two distinct
contributions. The first is to advance economic understanding of

that a particular scholar has in mind can be crucial to his or her transition policy recommenda
tion. For now, it is enough to understand that there are degrees of retroactivity; that is, a new rule
can be applied more or less retroactively. See Saul Levmore,

The Case for Retroactive Taxation,
22 J Legal Stud 265, 266-72 (1993). More precise definitions will be offered as the Review un
folds.

2

Shaviro explicitly adopts the "social welfare norm of utilitarianism, which seeks to

maximize social welfare" (p

16). I will therefore use the term "welfarist" to describe Shaviro's

approach to transition issues. For a precise account of Shaviro's normative assumptions, see pp

16-19. For a comprehensive defense of social welfare maximization as the appropriate norm for
of Fairness Versus Hu
man Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business, Harvard Law School, Working Paper No 277 (Mar 2000), available online at
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/> (visited May 12, 2000).
evaluating public policy, see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shaven, Principles
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the transition issues posed by rule changes generally, albeit with
particular reference to issues in the federal income tax. The sec
ond is to integrate the economics with a political science analysis
that is distinctive to the present federal income tax system, in or
der to propose norms that should generally guide transition prac
tice in this area (pp 1-2).
Are these ambitious goals achieved? Remarkably, to a large ex
tent they are. For example, Shaviro advances the "economic under
standing" of transition issues in a number of different ways, perhaps
most significantly in his sustained argument against the use of surprise
retroactive taxation as a nondistortionary source of revenue and in his
introduction of a new taxonomy of rule changes.
However, it is with respect to the book's second stated objective
("to integrate the economics with a political science analysis that is
distinctive to the present federal income tax") (p 2) that Shaviro's
most imaginative contributions come. For example, he develops and
applies a public choice perspective to the tax transitions question, a
perspective that includes a refreshingly realistic (if somewhat cynical)
assessment of the tax lawmaking process. In addition, he makes bold
and potentially controversial use of the "widespread consensus among
tax policy thinkers" that the welfare-maximizing tax system is one that
approaches the comprehensive tax base ("CTB") ideal by doing away
with all (or almost all) tax preferences (p 93).
Although Shaviro's framework is cleverly conceived and de
fended, the "concrete policy payoff'' it generates is something of a dis
appointment (p 14). After making a great show of the extent to which
the new view transitions framework fails to incorporate the reality of
political decisionmaking, Shaviro ends up adopting a version of the
new view recommendations, albeit on different grounds (p 229). The
reason for this anticlimactic conclusion, however, lies not with a lack
of nuance or subtlety in Shaviro's analysis. It is difficult to imagine a
more nuanced and subtle analysis. Rather, the reason lies in the nature
of the transition problem, especially in the tax-legislative context, as
well as a curious characteristic of public-choice-oriented normative
tax policy scholarship.
This Review will, in a broad sense, follow Shaviro's characteriza
tion of the book's objectives. Part I will summarize the existing eco
nomic framework for analyzing legal transitions and retroactivity is
sues (with major emphasis on tax transitions). Although Shaviro
makes numerous interesting contributions to this framework, this Re
view will examine only the two most significant of these. That will be
done in Part II. Then, Part III will focus on Shaviro's principal innova
tion: his introduction of a thoroughgoing public choice perspective
and CTB ideology to the tax transitions debate.

1510
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I. THE EXISTING ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK3
A.

Choosing the Optimal Transition Policy
What is a "transition policy" anyway? The idea is to exert some

influence over the decisions of political actors, to affect how they de

cide to implement new rules. Shaviro provides the best articulation of
this idea in his concept of a "constitutional norm." As Shaviro points
out, a constitutional transition norm need not be, and usually is not,
legally binding on the political decisionmakers in question-the ones
who are making the policy changes to which the norm will apply. But a
transition norm, to be effective, must at least be a "stable long-term
rule or aspiration" that is somewhat "binding," at least in the sense of

constraining or influencing the behavior of government actors (p 92).4
Thus, in the legislative context, the transition policy would be the pre
vailing norm, whether implicit or explicit, that tends to govern ("influ
ence") legislators' decisions as to how transition losses and gains will

be handled in the event of rule changes.5
The next question is the one to which normative transition schol
arship has largely been addressed: What should our transition norm
be? And should it be different in different contexts? Before economic
analysis was applied to that question, normative scholarship on the
subject tended to focus on the "reasonable expectations" of investors

and on the unfairness of making rule changes apply to those who had
relied on prior law.6 Thus, the traditional view (again, sometimes called
the old view) disapproved of retroactivity generally, especially in the
legislative context. Economic analysis changed the terms of the discus
sion and reversed the presumption, introducing a generally more fa
vorable view of retroactivity and less favorable view of transition re
lief.
By far, the most comprehensive statement of the existing (pre

Shaviro) economic framework for analyzing legal transitions can be

3
Because of space constraints, this summary will be highly abridged. For a full review of
the economic literature on transition issues, see Saul Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, 3 New Pa/

grave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 340 (MacMillan 1998); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv L Rev 511 (1986); and the Shaviro book itself.
4

It is in this sense that transition scholars often speak of a government's "binding com

mitment" or "precommitment" to follow a particular transition policy. See, for example, Kyle

D.

Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommit

ment, 94 Mich L Rev 1129, 1140, 1148, 1157 (1996).
s

One of the principal contributions of Shaviro's book is to summarize the existing tax

transition norms that appear to be currently in effect with respect to certain types of tax law
changes (pp 98-110).
.6

See, for example, Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J Legal Stud 373, 391 (1977);

Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
Harv L Rev 692, 692-93 (1960).
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found in a 1986 article by Louis Kaplow.' According to that frame
work, the choice of an efficient transition policy turns, at least initially,
on two general questions: Fxrst, what transition norm would optimally

·

allocate the risk of a change in government policy, that is, the risk of

transition losses and transition gains? And, second, what transition
norm would give investors the optimal incentives concerning whether
and how much to rely on any government policy?
B.

Th e New View: Focusing o n Risk Incentives
Standard economic analysis generally assumes that individual in

vestors dislike risk, all else being equal. How do we know this? Inves
tors regularly buy insurance policies or diversify their stock portfolios
as ways of reducing the variance of outcomes that they face. Just as in

vestors appear to want to shed themselves of such market-created
risks, presumably they would like to do the same with government
created risks, such as the risk of experiencing an unexpected transition
loss or gain caused by a change in government policy. A number of
scholars have observed this equivalence.8 And it is an observation that
carries some weight, because it is also generally assumed that private

investors should be responsible for finding their own ways to deal with
market-created risks. Thus,

if there

is a general equivalence between

market-created risk and government-created risk, the starting assump
tion should be the same: private parties should be expected to find
ways (through insurance policies or portfolio diversification or what
ever) of dealing with the risk of uncompensated changes in govern
ment policy that would accompany a retroactivity norm."
But perhaps there is something different about transition risk.
Perhaps there is some reason why, with respect to government-created
risk, private markets working alone are not sufficient. The economic
framework, primarily in Kaplow's article, looks at this question and
concludes that, in fact, the market-risk/government-risk equivalence
generally holds. Specifically, part of Kaplow's analysis is devoted to
working through a number of reasons why we generally expect private
insurance

mechanisms to

be

more

effective

than

government

provided insurance at dealing with the standard insurance inefficien-

7
See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 520-66 (cited in note 3). Although the Kaplow article
provides the most comprehensive statement of the economic framework for analyzing legal tran
sitions, the article does not reach definitive conclusions as to what the welfare-maximizing transi
tion policy would be for any particular type of rule change.
8
See id at 533-36; Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in In
come Tax Revision, 126 U Pa L Rev 47, 65 (1977); Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Re
fonn, 6 J Pub Econ 77, 92-93 (1976).
9 See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 513-14, 520, 527-36 (cited in note 3); Graetz, 126 U Pa L
Rev at 65 (cited in note 8).

·
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cies caused by the asymmetrical information between insurer and in
sured; that is, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
And he explains why those problems are present with respect to tran
sition risk as well, an assessment with which Shaviro appears to
agree.

10

The implication of this analysis is that any risk-allocation defense
of an anti-retroactivity norm- or a norm favoring transition relief
can largely be ignored. Since we can count on investors to deal with
transition risk on their own, our transition norm need not be con
cerned with it. That conclusion seems to have gained considerable
"
Indeed, even Shaviro asserts that "the transi

sway in the literature.

tion risk analysis often lacks significant policy implications" (p

42) .12

In addition to worrying about optimal risk allocation (at least
long enough to dismiss it), the standard economic analysis of legal
transitions is concerned with giving private parties the incentive to an
ticipate rule changes. And this concern is not dismissed. The basic ar
gument is straightforward: a transition policy that credibly promises

not to alleviate the retroactivity effects of rule changes will encourage
investors to take into account the possibility of such changes- even to
anticipate them. And this will generally be a good thing,

if we

assume

that government policy, over time, will tend toward the maximization
13
of social welfare.
Although the best example of the welfare-enhancing incentive ef
fect of a retroactivity transition norm is that of a product ban (which,

if made retroactive, gives manufacturers the incentive to

pursue opti

mal safety for pretransition as well as post-transition production), it is
10

See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at

540-42 (cited in note 3). Shaviro seems to agree with this

conclusion at p 42.
11 For example, in none of his work on retroactivity does Saul Levmore discuss the risk
allocation question. He focuses instead exclusively on the incentive dimension of the transition
issue, which is discussed in the next section. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Repa

rations, 99 Colum L Rev 1657, 1661-86 (1999); Levmore, Retroactive Taxation at 340 (cited in
note 3); Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 279-91 (cited in note 1). Furthermore, I am aware of no ar
ticle or book that explores the government-risk question, as Kaplow poses it, i� any level of de
tail. Therefore, Shaviro's conclusion that the significance of the transition risk issue "has mainly
been exaggerated" is puzzling (p 42).
12 Both Kaplow and Shaviro, however, mention a possible exception to this dismissal of
transition risk concerns. Specifically, they note that, in situations in which extremely low
probability events are systematically underestimated by individuals, those individuals may tend
to underinsure, with potentially drastic consequences if the event comes to pass. Kaplow, 99 Harv

L Rev at 602-03 (cited in note 3); Shaviro (pp 33-42).
13

Put differently, if we believe that good policy changes will in the long run outweigh bad

ones, a rule that generally induces behavioral changes by investors in anticipation of rule changes
will likewise enhance social welfare. This idea was first emphasized in a classic tax article by Mi
chael Graetz and was later built into the larger economic framework by Kaplow. See Graetz, 126

U

Pa L Rev at

65-66

(cited in note

8); Kaplow, 99

Harv L Rev at

533

n

65

(cited in note

3)

(quoting Graetz). When Shaviro refers to this idea, he too calls it the "new view," and he cites
Graetz as the originator (pp

43, 64, 101)

.
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not the only one, not by a long shot. Indeed, part of what makes the
incentives analysis so appealing, and controversial, is the strikingly
broad range of rule changes to which it can be applied. Thus, the same
welfare-enhancing incentive aspect of a retroactivity norm exists with
respect to many types of rule changes, including, but not limited to: a
judicial decision expanding (in an efficiency-enhancing way) tort li
ability for product-caused accidents; the repeal of a special tax prefer
ence provision that (for whatever reason) has proved to be a bad idea;
or even the taking of private property for public use. In each of these
cases, so long as one assumes that the government (including the leg
islative, executive, and judicial branches) is generally moving in the
right (welfare-enhancing) direction over time, the new view incentives
analysis would apply.1•
The Old View Revisited: Incentive Subsidies and
Opportunistic Retroactivity

C.

It was to this basic new view economic framework (and explicitly
conditioned on its assumptions) that I made a small contribution in an
article published in 1996.15 In that article, I offered an efficiency-based
justification for providing transition relief with respect to a specific
category of rules. My argument was that, if there is an identifiable
category of rules that the government uses as a means of inducing
specific reliance by investors and that we want to preserve for the
government's future use (a category of rules that I call "incentive sub
sidies"), then adopting a transition policy that permits the imposition
of transition losses upon repeal of such rules would come at a cost.
The problem is this: investors, knowing of such a transition policy,
would demand a larger subsidy than if the transition policy forbade
retroactive repeal. I call this the "default-premium effect."16 Indeed, at
the limit, if the retroactivity norm were sufficiently extreme-if the
norm essentially said that whatever incentive subsidy the government
provides will be opportunistically confiscated ex post (through nomi
nal retroactivity or outright theft if necessary), then inducing reliance
on the government's incentive subsidies would become impossible.
Given my adoption of the new view assumption of a benevolent,
long run, social-welfare-maximizing government, one might ask why
the concern for government opportunism. Can a benevolent govern
ment engage in theft? In fact, from a purely welfarist perspective, a

14

As will be discussed more fully in Part III.A below, Shaviro observes that there may be

categories of rule changes for which the desirability of this anticipatory incentive effect will not
hold.

15
16

See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 4).
Id at 1140.
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certain sort of government opportunism is entirely consistent with the
benevolent-government assumption. According to the literature on
the so-called "time-inconsistency" problem, developed by scholars
within the rational-expectations school of macroeconomic theory, an
otherwise social-welfare-maximizing government will behave oppor
tunistically (will become a wealth expropriator)

if (a)

it cannot make

binding promises not to do so, and (b) despite this fact, investors have

no clue that the government would ever do such a dastardly thing."
Under those assumptions, it can be shown that a policy plan of prom
ising not to enact opportunistic expropriative retroactive rule changes,
and then promptly turning around and doing just that, is in fact "op
timal."13
The lesson of rational-expectations theory, however, is that such a

policy plan, though optimal

if it were to succeed, cannot in fact possi

bly succeed. Investors are not that stupid. They will anticipate such
opportunism, perhaps even before they have been burned once but
certainly afterward. And the government's bait-and-switch plan will
break down over time. In fact, the certainty of its long run breakdown

will feed back into the original decision by the government to adopt

the plan in the first place. In other words, once rational expectations
are taken into account, such an optimal plan is said to be "time

inconsistent."19 A nonstarter.

The default-premium effect that I have associated with the retro

active repeal of incentive subsidies is

analogous to this time

inconsistency problem.20 Fearing expropriative retroactive repeal, in
vestors will demand a default premium in their incentive subsidies, or
may not be willing to rely on them at all. Thus, according to my analy
sis, the welfare-maximizing transition norm with respect to incentive
subsidies

may

be one that forbids (or at least discourages) the gov

ernment from opportunistically expropriating previously provided in
centive subsidies. That norm, in other words,

may

include an implicit

precommitment (again, a constitutional norm) that the legislature will

provide some minimal level of transition relief should a given class of
incentive subsidies be repealed.

Notice I said "may." Whether such a special transition norm for

incentive subsidies would in fact be welfare enhancing depends on a
17 The classic article on the subject is Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, Rules
Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J Pol Econ 473, 474-75 (1977).

Shaviro refers to this literature and the idea of opportunistic "rent extraction" briefly (p 89).
18 That such an outcome could conceivably be called "optimal" is what drives some schol
ars to doubt the welfarist approach.
19 See, for example, Stanley Fischer, Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation and the Benevo
lent Dissembling Government, 2 J Econ Dynamics & Control 93, 94, 98 {1980) (demonstrating the
benefits of credible government precommitment to optimal tax policy plan).
20
See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1143 n 54 (cited in note 4).
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series of difficult conceptual and empirical questions. For starters, how
does this old view goal of encouraging taxpayer reliance on certain
government actions balance out against the new view goal of encour

aging investors to anticipate rule changes? The answer may depend on
our confidence in the initial decision to use the incentive subsidy in

the first place and in our assessment of the likely need to use such in
centive subsidies in the future.21

Another objection that I have heard to my time-inconsistency/
default-premium argument runs as follows: when the government

needs to make a binding commitment to induce specific acts of reli

ance on the part of investors, it should do so through the use of a legal
contract, and only through the use of a legal contract. Th.at is, after all,

what government contracts are for: to allow the government to make

binding promises about how much it will pay, to whom, and for what.
Incentive subsidies, especially in the form of tax preferences, should
never be used in that way. Rather, the argument goes, with any type of

policy tool besides a government contract, no

should be made as to whether

government commitment

payment will be forthcoming. To put the

argument in quintessentially new view terms, with respect to such in

centive subsidies, it is better to put investors on notice that such tax

preferences, like any other law, can change in any way imaginable, in

cluding nominally retroactively, and at any time so that investors ad
just their expectations accordingly and take steps to anticipate
changes.

In response to this objection, I can only fall back on my own in

tuition, since a definitive resolution of the issue must await empirical
investigation. And my intuition is this:

if we

believe that the govern

ment should be able to make somewhat binding precommitments with
respect to its contractual arrangements,22 it is likely that the govern
ment should also be able to make precommitments (albeit only im

plicit ones and only binding in the sense in which Shaviro talks of the

21

For example, as will be discussed more fully in Part ill.C below, Shaviro makes an argu

ment that suggests that, for public choice reasons, we should adopt a transition policy that dis
courages the use of all (or almost all) tax preferences (p

98). If one takes that argument seriously,

the threat of opportunistic retroactive repeal of such provisions might be just the ticket. How far
Shaviro wants to push the argument is unclear.
22

How "binding" we want even government contracts to be is something of an open ques

tion, for the same sort of public choice reasons that (as Shaviro emphasizes) we should be cau
tious about "guaranteeing" tax preferences. For recent public choice oriented arguments that
government contracts should be considered less binding on the government than private con
tracts are on private parties, see, for example, Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract:
Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S Cal lnterdiscipl L J 467, 469 (1999); Daniel
R Fischel and Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 Am L & Econ
Rev 313,

327-32 (1999). Even these scholars, however, assume that government contracts will be

binding to some extent. See Hadfield, 8 S Cal Interdiscipl L J at 469 (proposing to analyze, not if,
but how the government is bound).

1516
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binding effects of "constitutional" norms) in some other settings in
which specific investor reliance is needed but entering into individual
contracts with investors is not practical. For example, it would pre
sumably be extremely difficult to use a series of direct government
contracts to replicate the type of broad-based reliance effect that a tax
credit or tax deduction can induce-that is, reliance on the part of
many investors in many parts of the country with relatively little in the
23
way of red tape and other transaction costs. Thus, if government con
tracts should be considered binding, perhaps incentive tax provisions
should be treated similarly, as being accompanied by an implicit pre
24
commitment to provide transition protection in the event of repeal.

In some respects, Shaviro seems to agree with my default
premium concern. For example, in his discussion of the transition-risk
analysis, with a concept he calls "transaction flexibility," Shaviro cap
tures the core of my precommitment idea (pp

37-40).

He suggests

that, where individually negotiated government contracts are imprac
tical, the government might "offer the same rule in a variety of 'fla
vors,' which differ only in the details of their transitional guarantees"
(p 38).25

D.

When Surprising Investors Is the Whole Point
The final element of the existing economic framework for ana

lyzing legal transitions is the idea of the ex post capital levy. Among
economists, it is sometimes argued that certain types of retroactive
taxes are desirable precisely

because they are a surprise to investors 

that is, precisely because they are not anticipated and have little or no
26
effect on taxpayers' incentives. The argument derives from the opti
mal-tax literature, which defines an optimal tax as one that produces
the least possible distortion of taxpayer or investor decisions -specifi
21
cally, the least possible effect on the labor-leisure tradeoff.
According to the optimal-tax perspective, then, the best tax is one
that the taxpayer can or will do nothing or very little to avoid. Such a
tax is sometimes referred to as a lump-sum tax. The head tax would be

See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 4).
And let me be clear: I do not mean that contract law should be applied to tax prefer
ences. Taxpayers should not be able to haul Congress into court for repealing an incentive sub
sidy without providing transition relief. Rather, my argument is that there should be-and, as will
be discussed in Part III.C below, there probably already is-a norm in Congress that constrains
such retroactive repeal.
25
There he was discussing the options of indexed versus unindexed government bonds, but
later he notes that "this practice of offering the same rule in multiple 'flavors' could be extended
to other contexts," including tax preferences (p 39).
26
See, for example, Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 273-78 (cited in note 1).
27 See James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
Rev Econ Stud 175, 175-76 (1971).
23

24
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one example: each individual taxpayer pays the same amount of tax.
Period. The problem is that a head tax is regarded as distributively
unjust. So are many other quasi-optimal taxes, such as excise taxes on
inelastically demanded consumer products. In part for that reason, we
have chosen at least at the federal level to rely primarily on income
and wage taxes. But taxing income or wages means also introducing
some distortion, as people can choose to earn less, substituting leisure
for work.
Enter the surprise retroactive tax. If the new tax is genuinely a
surprise to taxpayers, then, by definition, they can do nothing to avoid
it. And the bigger the surprise, the better. Plus, it is possible to make a
retroactive tax somewhat progressive by making the tax base some
thing that correlates with current income or wealth, say, past income
or wealth. Thus, for one example, Saul Levmore notes the potential
optimal-tax benefits of applying a tax rate increase or tax deduction
repeal nominally retroactively, to tax years prior to the year of enact
ment.28
As was already discussed above in connection with the default
premium effect, the problem with trying to surprise taxpayers with a
retroactive tax, from an incentives perspective, is that taxpayers are
not easily fooled that way.29 If there is a transition policy in effect that
permits the adoption of nominally retroactive income tax rate in
creases, or of ungrandfathered wealth-tax increases, such a policy will

eventually be found out; the news will work its way down to the

masses, leading to just the sort of anticipatory behavioral effects that
optimal-tax theory tells us to avoid. Again, this is the lesson of the ra
tional-expectations approach.30
IT. SHAVIRO'S SPIN ON THE EXISTING ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
A.

Taking Rational Expectations Seriously: Surprise Taxation Can
Never Work
One of Shaviro's most important contributions to the existing

economic framework is his comprehensive and sustained attack on the
optimal-tax justification for surprise retroactive taxes. In Shaviro's

view, the findings of the rational-expectations literature, mentioned

above, justify a somewhat extreme and potentially controversial con28

See Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 274 (cited in note

29

Levmore discusses this possibility. See id at 274, 276. One of his responses is that even a

1).

little surprise is better than none. See id. My retort was this: "True enough. However, having been
hit once with a 'bolt from the blue,' and knowing that Congress will be tempted to try the same
trick again, taxpayers will begin to watch the sky for the next one." Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at

1172

n 140 (cited in note 4).

30

See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1172 n

ample of the time-consistency problem.").

140 (cited in note 4) ("This is the quintessential ex
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clusion: that the use of surprise taxes can never have long-run effi
ciency benefits.

In developing this position, Shaviro points out that rational
expectations theory does not claim that investors will never be sur

prised by rule changes. Of course, they will Rather, the claim is some
.

what more modest: given that individuals will learn from experience,
we should assume that they will not be fooled by a program of sur
prise macroeconomic policy changes, at least not

in a systematic way.

That is, even if some investors are fooled, there is no obvious direction
that the errors will tend to take. Some will underestimate the likeli

hood of the policy change; others will overestimate it. In any event, the

under- and overestimation errors will cancel each other out, thereby

canceling out the lump-sum benefits of a long-term program of sur

prise policy changes.

From these seemingly modest premises, Shaviro concludes that

the analysis of transition issues should proceed on the assumption that

it is impossible ever to fool investors systematically in the long run.31

Moreover, although Shaviro acknowledges the possibility that cogni
tive biases on the part of individual investors (such as systematic un
derestimation of retroactive policy changes) could in theory under

mine his strong rational-expectations presumption (pp 22-25),32 he ul
timately dismisses that possibility.33

Thus, we are left with Shaviro's operating assumption: that a pro

gram of surprise retroactive taxation cannot in the long run have op
timal-tax benefits.34 But what about something short of a "program" of
surprise taxes? What about the possibility of using this policy tool only

31 "Rational expectations suggests that, if one is thinking about the Jong run, the incentive
effects of retroactive rule changes can fruitfully be analyzed by ignoring their retroactivity and
treating them instead as if they were preannounced or otherwise fully anticipated" (p 22).
32 Where Shaviro reviews conclusions from the fields of cognitive psychology and behav
ioral or "quasi-rational economics."
33 Specifically, he argues that, until advocates of surprise retroactive taxation can offer em
pirical evidence that there is a specific cognitive bias that systematically distorts investors' per
ceptions of the likelihood of future retroactive taxes, we should assume that surprise retroactive
taxation cannot be us�d successfully as a Jump sum tax (p 25). Of course, determining which side
in a debate bears the burden of empirical proof will often determine the winner of the debate. In
Shaviro's defense, however, he has offered something more. He has presented the conclusions of
the rational-expectations literature, a literature, according to Shaviro, whose empirical findings
strongly confirm its hypothesis: that investors cannot generally be fooled systematically by a
program of surprise policy changes. Although Shaviro notes that the "full-fledged rational expec
tations approach
has not entirely carried the day" in the macroeconomics literature, he im
plies that the remaining nonbelievers are merely suffering from an insufficiently Jong-run per
spective (p 21). ("Rational expectations still holds over a longer term, however'' (p 21).) Whether
he is right about that conclusion I do not know.
- 34
This conclusion seems somewhat in tension with his willingness, elsewhere in the book,
to entertain the possibility that individual investors may systematically underestimate the "risk"
of uncompensated policy changes (p 40).
• . .
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on rare, exceptional occasions-such as when we finally (once and for

all)

manage to shift from the current income-based tax to something

closer to a consumption-based tax? Maybe that would be a good occa
sion for a onetime-only wealth tax, a capital levy accompanied by a
promise never to do anything like that again, at least not anytime
soon.
Shaviro heaps scorn on this idea, and perhaps rightly so. The
problem with the "just this once" approach, of course, is that the gov
ernment's very use of the retroactive tax may well undermine the
35
credibility of the promise not to repeat the trick. To the contrary, it
might have the perverse effect of alerting investors to the possibility
of retroactive taxation, a possibility that many of them may never
36
have considered before. Thus, in Shaviro's words: "Today's 'surprise
party' may therefore prompt tomorrow's 'surprise non-party,' result
ing in compensating errors in anticipation of retroactive change that
prevent the government from using surprise to its advantage on bal
ance" (p

22).

He may be right about that as well. But then again, he may not.
To the best of my knowledge, the precise findings of the rational
expectations literature do not speak directly to the question at hand:
that is, would it be possible for Congress, at the time it enacts a sur
prise retroactive tax, to make a credible commitment not to do so
again for a sufficiently long period of time that the incentive effect
would be trivial? In fact, we do not have

any

empirical evidence, one

way or the other, on that question. Given this situation of profound
uncertainty, what should our conclusion be?
If Shaviro's position on surprise taxation represents one extreme
answer to that question, presumably the other extreme-the view that
surprise taxes could be used effectively on a regular basis-has few
adherents. An interesting question is what about the middle ground?
That is, given the absence of empirical studies demonstrating specific
cognitive biases on the part of investors with respect to retroactive
taxes (and given that such studies may not be forthcoming anytime
soon), should we consider an "only occasionally" or "just this once"
retroactive tax strategy in the meantime? I, for one, find the possibility
of a just-this-once retroactive tax somewhat attractive, although I ob
37
viously see the dangers that such a strategy would entail.

35 See Logue,94 Mich L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 4).
36 See id. "What's more, taxpayers may be less likely to believe Congress's commitment if
it comes on the heels of the first surprise retroactive tax." Id. "Moreover, given the salience of
the first retroactive tax, taxpayers may have a tendency to overestimate the chance of its reoc
currence." Id at 1172 n 140.
37 As I noted above, perhaps the just-this-once promise would be somewhat credible if the
retroactive tax is enacted as part of a presumably onetime-only shift from an income tax to a
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Developing the Policy Change/Accounting Change Distinction
The other major contribution that Shaviro makes to the existing

transitions framework is the addition of a taxonomy for classifying

rule changes. The most important aspect of this taxonomy - the one
that he uses throughout the remainder of the book-is the distinction

between the "policy content" and the "accounting content" of rules.

According to Shaviro's taxonomy, every tax rule can be divided into
its policy content (the efficiency and distributional aspect of the rule)

and its accounting content (the details of the rule's implementation
"that could in principle be changed without affecting its policy con
tent") (pp

53-54).

Shaviro uses these ideas to distinguish between

"policy change" retroactivity and "accounting change" retroactivity.

Policy change retroactivity arises in situations in which the antici

patory (new view) incentive effects of retroactivity would be desirable
if and only if the rule change itself is desirable.38 Thus, the merits of
retroactivity in such cases depend on the "steady -state merits" of the
new rule itself (p

48).

By contrast, accounting change retroactivity

arises in situations in which anticipatory incentive effects would be

bad, and should be discouraged, even

if

the rule change itself is

good-that is, regardless of the new rule's steady-state merits (p 50).

To exemplify policy change retroactivity, Shaviro offers the stan
dard product ban example. In addition, he mentions the example of
the repeal of the tax exemption for municipal bond interest. In both
cases, whether making the repeal retroactive (applicable to pretransi

tion investments) will have beneficial incentive effects depends on the

efficiency of the incentive effects that the new rules themselves are
expected to have. Thus,

if we think

the product ban and the elimina

tion of the bond exemption will improve incentives-that is,

if

we

think the government has made social-welfare-increasing decisions by

adopting those rules, then making those decisions retroactive will in

duce efficient behavioral responses for pretransition investments as
well. And

if

we think the rule changes are bad, retroactivity would

likewise be bad (p 48).
The starkest example of accounting change retroactivity is the
hy pothetical shift from a tax-accounting y ear that is based on the cal
endar y ear (ending, of course, on December 31) to one that is based
on a fiscal y ear (ending on June 30). Absent some sort of deliberate

transition relief, such as the introduction of a special onetime short ac-

consumption tax.
38 And here we must again be careful in defining retroactivity. In general, when Shaviro
uses the term retroactivity-such as with his idea of a "policy change retroactive tax"-he means
something like nominal prospectivity without grandfathering. When he means nominal retroac
tivity, which he thinks is and should be discouraged, he uses that term explicitly, and so will I.
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counting year, some income may be taxed exactly twice in the transi
tion year, and some may escape tax entirely (p 50).39 The reason this
example is so powerful, and why Shaviro's ultimate conclusion that an
antiretroactivity norm should apply to such cases, is that there is no
apparent (or even conceivable) policy justification for such a random
result. That is, one cannot easily imagine what beneficial anticipatory
behavior a retroactivity norm could have in such a case.
The utility of the policy change/accounting change distinction,
however, will depend ultimately not on its application in the obvious
case, such as the accounting rule change, but in the more difficult
cases. To take perhaps the most important example in Shaviro's bo_ok,
consider the accounting change and policy change aspects of propos
als to shift from our current income tax to a more consumption-based
tax regime (ch 9). Shaviro rightly, and skillfully, elucidates a number of
ways that several leading consumption-tax proposals conflate an array
of tax-rule changes that can usefully be disaggregated into various
policy change aspects and accounting change aspects (pp 181-95).
For example, Shaviro notes that the essential difference between
an income tax and a consumption tax is the treatment of the "return
to waiting." Thus, if we imagine two households with the same wage
flows over time, "the income tax imposes a higher tax burden on the
later than the sooner consumer, whereas the consumption tax imposes
the same tax burden, in present value terms, on each" (p 171 ) . Thus,
the policy aspect of shifting from an income tax to a consumption tax
would amount to a decision to exempt the return to waiting. In
Shaviro's taxonomy, therefore, whether that particular change should
be made retroactive (that is, whether retroactivity would have desir
able anticipatory incentive effects) depends on the desirability of the
consumption tax idea itself, the idea of exempting the return to wait
ing. (For example, if we think that taxpayers are saving too little, and
that a consumption tax will tend to encourage more savings, making
the move to a consumption tax retroactive might induce desirable an
ticipatory savings decisions.)
Most major consumption tax proposals, however, also include a
number of accounting changes as well, which are not clearly identified
as such (p 184). Admirably picking on someone his own size, Shaviro
cites as an example of this problem the scholarship of eminent public
finance economists Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff, whose
work in tax policy and tax-transition policy fields is, truly, "in many
ways path breaking" (p 173). According to Shaviro, Auerbach and
Kotlikoff define a consumption tax as "a wage tax plus a onetime
39 As Shaviro acknowledges, this example is taken from Kaplow. See also Kaplow, 99 Harv
L Rev at 613 (cited in note 3).
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Shaviro then rightly ob

serves that this wealth tax really derives from an accounting change
not a policy change, and he suggests further (again rightly) that under

standing of the issues would be enhanced if such a wealth tax were not

"built into" (or, made to seem an essential part of) the definition of a
consumption

tax.

Thus,

Shaviro

suggests

that

the

policy

change/accounting change distinction, if nothing else, should be kept
"
in mind for the sake of conceptual clarity and rigor.

In addition, however, Shaviro wants to make a somewhat bolder
use of his policy change/accounting change idea. He wants to argue
that, just as retroactivity can produce only undesirable anticipatory
behavior in the paradigm cases of accounting changes, making con
sumption-tax-related accounting changes retroactive can likewise only

be a bad idea. Ergo, the implication is that the onetime wealth tax in
the Auerbach and Kotlikoff consumption tax proposal (and in many

other such proposals) is a bad idea. In one sense, a onetime wealth tax
(whenever it is imposed) has obvious similarities to the accounting

year change mentioned above: taxpayers who happen to be wealthy at
the time of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff transition get hammered;
whereas, those whose wealth will be accumulated primarily after the
transition enjoy a windfall gain. That distinction seems pretty arbi
trary.
In another sense, however, a onetime tax on all wealth existing at
the time of the shift to a consumption tax looks somewhat less arbi
trary than the failure to provide transition relief in the accounting
year situation. That is, a onetime tax on wealth could conceivably be
structured so as to be roughly consistent with our notions of distribu
42
tive justice or progressivity. The same could not as easily be said
about the tax that would be produced by a retroactive shift from an
annual to a fiscal accounting year. Moreover, if taxpayers could be
convinced that this tax truly is a onetime-only thing Gust as the dra
matic shift from an income to a consumption tax could plausibly be
sold as a onetime-only move), it might have the optimal-tax benefits
discussed in Part I.D above. That possibility, of course, provides a
plausible justification for Auerbach and Kotlikoffs approach of link-

40 Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Dynamic Fiscal Policy 51-59 (Cambridge
1987).
41 The example of an accounting change wealth tax that Shaviro most often refers to as
being "built into" consumption-tax proposals, and the one that gets the most attention in the lit
erature, is the onetime elimination of basis ("the tax system's record of outlays that qualify for
eventual cost recovery but have not yet been deducted") upon the adoption of the consumption
tax (p 10). As Shaviro points out, a basis "wipeout" could be done entirely within the income tax
system and without a shift to a consumption tax (pp 10, 184).
42 Especially if accompanied by a shift to a more steeply progressive wage tax, to improve
progressivity with respect to post-transition wealth accumulation.
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ing the wealth tax to the shift to a consumption tax. As we have seen,
however, these arguments do not fly with Shaviro. He just does not
believe that such surprise retroactive taxes can work, even if "hidden"
in the form of an ostensibly (though not actually) necessary element
of a massive "one time" tax policy change.43
III. SHAVIRO'S PRIMARY INNOVATIONS: INTRODUCING POLITICAL
REALITY AND TAX POLICY EXPERT OPINION
A.

Attacking the Benevolent-Government Assumption
Recall from Part LC the assumption, which underlies the new

view incentives analysis, that the long

run

path of government deci

sionmaking is upward, towards the overall improvement of social wel
fare. Not that every rule change has to be for the better; there will be
mistakes and corrections and even mistaken corrections. But the gen
eral trend will be in the right direction. There will be progress. Thus, at
its core, the new view is optimistic about the capacity of individuals,
collectively through their government, to identify the common good
and to achieve it.""
Shaviro rains on this parade. Drawing on an influential branch of
political science, he summarizes three "core defects of public political
choice that discourage adopting optimistic new view assumptions
about government decisions" (p

66). These defects, which he terms the

problems of aggregation, organization, and information, are well

known. The problem of aggregation includes various voting paradoxes
(including Arrow's theorem and the cycling phenomenon) that call
into question the possibility of aggregating individual preferences in a
coherent way. The problem of organization includes interest group
theory, which sees government as a means of transferring wealth from
the disorganized many to the well organized few. And the problem of
information simply recognizes that decisions tend to be worse when
made in ignorance and that, for all sorts of reasons (including defects
one and two), many public political decisions are made in ignorance
(pp

67-73).

Given these defects in the political decisionmaking pro-

43
Again, as I suggested above, Shaviro may be right about that conclusion, but whether he
is depends on the merits of his anti-surprise-tax arguments (discussed in Part II.A), and not on
the accounting change/policy change distinction.
44
It is important to note that, although Kaplow, Graetz, and some of the other architects of
the existing economic/welfarist framework have used the above-stated benevolent-government
assumption in their analyses, those scholars are by no means unaware of the sort of political con
cerns that Shaviro makes the focus of his book. For one example, in Kaplow's article, there is a
long section on what he terms "institutional considerations," which include many of the public
choice sort of concerns that Shaviro raises. See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 566-76 (cited in note
3). In addition, Levmore's article on retroactive taxation is, at its core, a public choice take on the
surprise-retroactive-tax question. Still, Shaviro's book represents the most thorough study to
date of the implications of public choice theory for a wide variety of transition issues.
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cess, "the mere fact of a policy change's adoption does not provide
strong evidence of whether it [and therefore the incentive effect of

making it retroactive] is good or bad" (p 73).

What follows from this observation? What is its implication for
the choice of a welfare-maximizing transitions policy? Shaviro admits
that, in the abstract, the answer is unclear. It is only in particular appli
cations that the "policy payoff'' will come (p

81).

Most of Shaviro's

book is devoted to working out the implications of these defects in the
tax lawmaking context.
B.

The Reality of the Tax Lawmaking Process: Worse than Sausage
If you think the legislative process in general is screwed up, wait

until you get a load of the tax lawmaking process. It is especially ugly,
says Shaviro. In support of this claim, he asserts that "[f]or decades,
there has been a widespread consensus among those who closely fol
low tax policy that the legislative process in this area is seriously
flawed, even by the standards of collective political choice generally"
(p

86). He then

goes on to argue that the tax lawmaking process ex

hibits the problems of organization and information (mentioned
above) to a substantially greater degree than do other types of law
making. Again, this assertion is supported by the widely held view that
"tax politics tends to be dominated by interest groups that seek favors
for themselves and that, through a norm of logrolling, almost never
oppose favors for each other" (pp

86-87)

(citations omitted).

It is not that Shaviro claims that tax lawmaking is unique in hav
ing these pathologies, only that it is one of several problem areas, one
of the areas of "distributive" politics, that is plagued by "particularly
destructive interest group influence" (p

87).

Other examples of dis

tributive politics that he mentions are tariff legislation and pork-barrel
spending (id). Whether Shaviro is right that tax lawmaking is excep
tional in this regard, or whether he is being unjustifiably tax-centric in
his public choice critique of the legislative process, is a question that is
beyond the scope of this Review. However, as will become clear below,
Shaviro's tax-exceptionalism arguments are central to his reasoning
and ultimately to his transition policy recommendations.

C.

The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Tax Preferences

Shaviro believes that the exceptional flaws in the tax policymak
ing process (that is, the chronic and severe problems of organization
and information) have produced a divergence between the tax system
that every tax policy expert worth his or her salt would recommend
and the tax system we actually have. Again invoking "a \videspread
consensus among tax policy thinkers," Shaviro urges that "society
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would benefit from the use of a more comprehensive tax base
("CTB") of either the income tax or consumption tax genre" (p 93).45
He then explains why the choice between the two CTBs -income or
consumption-turns out not to be a momentous decision (with every

thing coming down to the question whether or not to have tax bur
dens turn on a taxpayer's preference for current or future consump
tion). Rather, the important tax policy question is whether to allow di
vergences from whichever tax base is chosen, whether to allow the use
of special tax preferences- credits, deductions, exclusions-that favor
some same-period investments over others. And for died-in-the-wool
CTBers such as Shaviro that question is a no brainer: the answer is a

resounding no.46 Keep the tax laws clean of tax preference provisions,
henceforth and forever.

Here's the rub: the actual income tax code happens to be (and has
always been) loaded with tax preferences. That fact is, unsurprisingly, a
source of vexation for CTBers." Again, the problem from Shaviro's
perspective is that any reasonably well-organized interest group can,
with a little perseverance, persuade Congress to enact that group's pet
tax subsidy. After all, those who stand to lose from the enactment of
such tax preferences-that is, the taxpayers in general- are unorgan
ized and therefore "little heard" (p 87). What's more (and this will be
come important below), Shaviro argues that taxpayers, because of a
manifestation of the endowment effect, do not seem to understand the
equivalence of a dollar that the government spends directly and a

dollar spent indirectly via tax revenues forgone because of some spe
cial "tax expenditure" provision (pp 87-88). The result is that, al

though the general good would be served by the adoption of a clean,
comprehensive, tax-subsidy-free income or consumption tax (or, put
differently, by the wholesale and permanent repeal of all existing tax

preference provisions), we just never seem to get there.
And here is where Shaviro's tax exceptionalism argument should
be emphasized again: he does not contend that Congress should never
intervene in the economy to encourage one type of investment over
another. Indeed, he expressly rejects that conclusion. But he is clearly
arguing that Congress should not, for the reasons just stated, intervene
to encourage one type of investment over an
other. The conclusion of this reasoning presumably is that Shaviro

through the tax system

45 Although he postpones "for another day" a full-fledged defense of the consensus view
of the cm idea, Shaviro clearly agrees with it and expressly adopts it for the purpose of his tax
transitions analysis (p 94).
46 "Within the present income tax, the cm norm suggests that tax preferences and dis
preferences that discriminate between alternative forms of same-period consumption or invest
ment are generally undesirable" (p 98).
47 One might even say a source of "sour grapes" (p 86).

I

·

1s26

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:1507

I

·

·

·

should favor any transition policy or practice that makes any tax pref
erence less attractive to taxpayers. As I will suggest below, however,
Shaviro seems to pull back from this conclusion at the last minute, for
reasons about which I can only speculate.
The next several steps in Shaviro's analysis are devilishly clever
and exceptionally (almost exceedingly) subtle. In effect, Shaviro sets
out to design a tax transition policy that will maximize the beneficial
effects of shifts in the direction of the CTB norm and minimize the
harmful effects of movements in the other direction... In other words,
he argues for a transition policy that will let the air out of tax prefer
ences once and for all, even though (and, in some sense, especially be
cause) Congress really likes using tax preferences. Therefore, in one
sense, Shaviro wants to develop a constitutional tax transition norm
that would ratify the current consensus among tax policy experts
about what our tax code should look like, despite Congress's apparent
disagreement with that consensus. Obviously, Shaviro has set no small
task for hin:lself.
He then starts out by making clear what his first-best tax transi
tion policy would be. Recall that under Shaviro's framework, with re
spect to the type of rule change that we are now discussing-a policy
change as contrasted with an accounting change-the choice of the
optimal transition norm depends on the desirability of the new rule it
self.49 Thus, a decision that the CTB norm is the best steady-state tax
policy has important implications, in theory, for the choice of an opti
mal tax transitions policy. Specifically, Shaviro's analysis to this point
would suggest that the first-best constitutional tax transition norm
would hold as follows: policy changes that represent movements in the
direction of the CTB ideal (for example, any curtailment, including
repeal, of a tax preference provision) will be made retroactive;
whereas, any policy changes that move away from the CTB ideal (for
example, the enactment or expansion of such provisions) will not. In
other words, transition relief should be provided in the latter cases, but
not in the former (p 99).50
As Shaviro concludes, however, such a transition policy would be
politically unrealistic. Consider the general message that such a norm
would send to lawmakers: if you (Congresspersons) decide to enact a
good change in the tax law (say, repealing a pesky tax preference),
please make that change retroactive. That is precisely the sort of
48

In keeping with the subtlety and balance exhibited throughout the book, in the applica

tions of this approach to specific cases, Shaviro notes that the CTB norm "does not provide the
correct answer all the time" (p 132).

49

50

See note 38 and accompanying text.
Again, any accounting changes, in his view, should never be made retroactive, for the

reasons already discussed in Part 11.B.
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change that we (CTBers) would like to see taxpayers trying to antici
pate. But if you decide to enact a bad rule change (for example, if you
enact, against our advice, yet another tax preference), well, make that
change apply prospectively only, to minimize the harm done.
Such a transition norm, Shaviro recognizes, would be neither sta
ble nor binding. Indeed, it would be entirely self-defeating. It is almost
impossible to imagine that the legislative majority that voted to ap
prove a new tax subsidy would take kindly to the idea of intentionally
blunting the effect of its new rule, merely because it is seen as a bad
idea in the eyes of the tax policy cognoscenti (p 99)."
D.

Offsetting the Transition Gain/Loss Asymmetry

By acknowledging that his idealized tax transition norm iS a non
starter, however, Shaviro does not mean to abandon his hope of using
tax transition policy to maximize the benefits of the CTB norm and
minimize the harm caused by departures from it. It just means that he
must take a more indirect route to achieving his goal. And here is the
path he takes: first, he recognizes that he must either go with an old
view approach (generally opposing retroactivity) or go with a new
view approach (generally supporting retroactivity), even though he
disagrees with key assumptions underlying both approaches. As a
practical matter, he concludes, that is the best that can be done (pp 98110).52
Therefore, the question becomes which approach-old view or
new view-would do the most to further the CTB norm. And Shaviro
answers that question by reference to an observation regarding what
he sees as the existing tax transition norm, an observation that is as
important to his eventual policy recommendations as is his embrace of
the CTB norm itself: he argues that there is currently a bias in Con
gress's tax transition constitutional norm in favor of compensating
transition losers (if the losses result from the repeal of a tax prefer
ence) and against taxing away or otherwise eliminating transition
gains (if the gains result from the enactment of a tax preference) (pp
88-91).SJ
51 Kaplow, in justifying his benevolent-government assumption, noticed this peculiarity
with the alternative of making transition policy turn on the steady-state merits of particular rule
changes. See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 566-76 (cited in note 3).
52 See id.
53 �haviro also discusses other types of tax rule changes, such as changes in marginal tax
rates. Because rate changes are often used to alter the distributional consequences of the tax
laws, the choice of a transition policy (effective dates and such) will turn on the same distribu
tion-efficiency tradeoffs that motivate the rate change in the first place (p 120). See also Logue,
94 Mich L Rev at 1170 (cited in note 4); Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 519 (cited in note 3); Graetz,
126 U Pa L Rev at 82-83 (cited in note 8). The same can be said of changes in the social security
laws, the subject of Shaviro's chapter 10.
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How do we know this is so? Shaviro offers both theoretical and
empirical support. On the theory side, he argues that interest group
theory would strongly suggest such a conclusion (p

89). The intuition,

which seems entirely plausible, is that the political forces that would
likely arise to oppose the imposition of a specific, identifiable transi
tion loss would tend to be stronger than forces that would oppose the
54
allowance of a transition gain.
On the empirical side, he offers two types of evidence. First, he
notes that everyone who writes about transition issues, including the
academics, tends to focus on transition "relief' for transition losses,
even though he or she may acknowledge the gain/loss symmetry of
55
transition issues. So there must be a bias. Second, and more impor
tant, he looks at actual congressional practice and provides a couple of
examples that support his gain/loss asymmetry hypothesis. For one, he
observes that the so-called "binding contract" grandfather rule tends
to be applied only when rule changes are made to the taxpayers' det
riment (p

90).56

Thus, it is applied when depreciation deductions are

curtailed, but not when they are expanded (id). And, of course, "rifle
shot" transition rules-which apply to only one or a few taxpayers
are always used only to prevent transition losses, never to take away
transition gains. Shaviro concludes that, although these two "asym
metric effective date rules represent a discrete practice of limited gen
eral significance, they arguably bespeak an important broader atti
tude" (id).
Whether Shaviro is right about the "general significance" of these

two examples, I don't know. But for purposes of this Review, I will as

sume he is. Therefore, let us assume that, owing to flaws in the tax
lawmaking process, the existing tax transition policy embodies a gen
eral bias in favor of compensating transition losses and against taxing
transition gains. So what? The answer lies in the CTB norm again.
From the perspective of a card-carrying CTBer such as Shaviro, a
norm that calls for compensating those who suffer transition losses
when a tax preference is repealed but that also allows transition gains
for those who anticipate new tax preferences cuts in exactly the wrong
direction. That is, the anticipatory incentive effects of such a transition
policy could not be worse.

54
With tranisition losses, the costs are concentrated on a relatively small and identifiable
group; whereas, with transition gains, the costs, in terms of lost productive efficiency, are spread
over all taxpayers.
55 See, even I did it. I mentioned the gain/loss symmetry in the introduction and then fo
cused on transition losses throughout most of this Review. Shaviro must be onto something.
56 This special grandfather rule holds that "property placed in service after a new provi
sion's effective date will nonetheless be taxed under the provision that it replaced, so Jong as the
taxpayer had a binding contract to construct or acquire the property by a specified date" (p 90).
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Imagine the message that norm sends to taxpayers: Thinking
about where to invest your resources? Wondering whether to rely on
those enticing tax preferences, given the possibility of their repeal?
Don't worry. Go ahead and rely on them. Even if they are repealed,
your reliance interest will be protected by special transition rules, so
long as you have a binding contract dated prior to the rule change.
What's more, and get this,

if you

can somehow

predict

what new tax

preferences Congress will cook up next, go ahead and invest there too,
because (thanks to this wonderful asymmetry in the way tax law
changes are implemented) the new tax preference will be applied ret
roactively to your pretransition investment. You can't lose.
This message, in effect, produces a transition subsidy for tax pref
erences and against the CTB norm. Shaviro, therefore, wants to
change the message, and he wants to do so by advocating a new tax
transition norm, which he hopes will come to replace the existing, bi
ased one. Given that his first-best transition norm is not politically
practical, and given that the norm against taxation of transition gains
is unlikely ever to change, Shaviro chooses the new view alternative
(which encourages policy change retroactivity), although, again, not
for new view reasons but for public choice reasons.
E.

A Problem for Public Choice Normative Scholarship
What is especially strange about Shaviro's transition policy con

clusion is how he expects to pitch his proposal to Congress. He recog
nizes that the "real reason for advocating this norm-that in practice
it may reduce Congress's predilection, through its transition policy, to
favor tax preference expansion over curtailment-might lack broad
appeal when stated forthrightly" (p

101). That

is an understatement.

Such a transition norm would have about as much chance of wooing
legislators as would his first-best transition policy (that is, make your
good laws retroactive, but not your bad ones).
In response to this concern, Shaviro suggests the possibility of ar
guing for the new view norm he proposes using a new view ("Graet
zean") justification rather than his own ("Shaviroesque"?} defense.
That is, he suggests arguing dishonestly, or least not "forthrightly," us
ing terms that "are likely to sound more pleasantly in Congressional
ears" (id). This suggestion, which I assume he means to be taken seri
ously, puts in stark relief one of the difficulties presented by public
choice-oriented normative scholarship: what is a public choice tax
policy scholar to do, when the audience he is trying to influence, whom
he is trying to get to adopt his recommendations, is composed of the
same group of people that his own theories suggest are not collec
tively capable of pursuing the public interest? The lesson of Shaviro's
analysis seems to be that, first, you figure out what the right policy is
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(taking everything into account, including public choice concerns) and
then you find a non-public-choice argument (which you may not

really believe) to sell your recommendation to the policymaker. As far
as I am aware, this approach itseif is another innovation of Shaviro's

book and perhaps the most important one, because it reveals the most

extreme implications for scholars of normative public choice analysis,
at least in the tax context.

The Anti-Nominal-Retroactivity Norm

F.

In addition to concluding that transition relief should be provided

for tax law "accounting changes" but not for tax law "policy changes,"
Shaviro seems to reach one other general conclusion regarding tax
transition policy: that the existing constitutional norm discouraging
"nominally retroactive" tax law changes should be retained.57 This

conclusion is puzzling. Not because it is a bad idea; indeed, the anti
nominal-retroactivity (''ANR") norm strikes me as eminently sensible,
at least when applied to certain types of tax incentive provisions, such
as investment credits (for example, the research and development
credit). Were it not for an implicit, but strong, ANR norm, our invest

ment credit provisions would have little effect.58
What is puzzling is Shaviro's endorsement of the ANR norm, at

least with respect to tax preferences. Given his apparent view that tax

preferences are generally bad, I would have expected him to go out on
a limb and favor nominally retroactive repeal of such provisions-the

same way that he seems to endorse nominal retroactivity with respect

to new product bans or the efficient expansion of tort liability doc

trine. But for reasons that remain a little mysterious, he pulls back
from that conclusion.

At first, I thought the mystery was solved by Shaviro's statement

that there was a well entrenched anti-nominal-retroactivity norm that

simply had to be acknowledged and recognized as a "brute fact" of

political life (p

109). That conclusion suggested no endorsement of the

norm, just a begrudging acceptance of it. But then Shaviro goes on to

offer a justification of the ANR norm, offering a rationale that is es

pecially interesting: he defends the ANR norm as a means of limiting
the potential reach of government opportunism and of enabling

"Congress to be able to make credible binding commitments (and not

57

Again, the precise definition of the term "nominally retroactive" is hard to pin down.

One plausible definition in the tax context is the application of a tax rule change to a prior year's
tax return (or to income earned or expenses incurred prior to the rule change).

58

When it comes to nominally retroactive tax rate increases, however, I am inclined toward

Levmore's position, which seems more open to the occasional use of retroactive rate increases
on optimal-tax normative grounds, but which acknowledges the public choice impediments to
such an approach. See Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 265 (cited in note 1) .
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just by the cumbersome practice of executing contracts)" (id). Thus,
Shaviro harkens back to his discussion of "transactional flexibility"
and "flavors" of rules, discussed in Part LC above, apparently adopting
a position that is consistent with my anti-opportunism arguments
against unfettered retroactivity.
How does all of this fit together? On one hand, Shaviro seems to
oppose the use of tax preferences, of any sort, ever. That sentiment
motivates his endorsement of the CTB norm and, ultimately, his new
view approach to transition losses. On the other hand, he favors the
existing ANR norm, which provides some transition protection to
those who invest in reliance on tax preferences. Perhaps the best way
to reconcile these positions is simply to say that Shaviro is splitting the
difference between two competing concerns. Although his main goal is
to discourage the use of tax preferences, because of the public choice
problem of the few exploiting the many, he also wants to make some
concession to the opposite concern, the problem of the many exploit
ing the few. And the ANR norm balances those concerns, in an admit
tedly imprecise but arguably tolerable way (pp 108-10).
CONCLUSION

Let me conclude with a few words on the "widespread consensus
among tax policy thinkers" (p 93) in favor of the CTB norm and
against the use of tax preferences, since, as Shaviro's book makes
clear, one's views on that consensus are important to the choice of an
optimal tax transition policy. Much has been written on the CTB norm
over the years, as staunch CTBers have called into question the use of
"tax expenditures"59 and anti-CTBers have questioned the coherence
and validity of the CTB ideal.Ill In my view, although the anti-CTBers
have had the better of the debate, the public choice concerns that
Shaviro raises give me pause. That is, if we can overcome the concep
tual difficulty of distinguishing between tax "preferences," on the one
hand, and "structural" elements of the tax base, on the other (which is
the difficulty rightly emphasized by anti-CTBers), Shaviro's worry
about interest group influence seems valid.
My primary concern, however, with the CTB norm as articulated
by Shaviro and incorporated into his transition recommendations is
"59 For a general discussion, see Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84
Harv L Rev 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern·
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv L Rev 705 (1970).
60
See Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View,
54 Tax Notes 1661, 1661 (1992); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
National Budget, 22 Natl Tax J 244, 247 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a
Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv L Rev 925, 934 (1967).
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the tax-exceptionalism problem. 1bis Review is not the place to pur
sue the issue at length, but I suspect that the public choice critique of
tax preferences would apply with equal strength to any other type of

governmental preference. Although Shaviro acknowledges that there
are other areas of "distributional politics" besides the tax area, he

does not seem to recognize that whenever Congress seeks to encour
age investments of one type over another, whether through the tax
laws or through direct expenditures,
cerns arise.

all

the same interest group con

His response is that tax preferences are structurally distinct from

direct expenditures in certain respects. The most important one, in

Shaviro's analysis, is the role of the endowment effect. As suggested
above, in Shaviro's view, there is a heuristic bias that "induces people

to draw an exaggerated distinction between money that is never paid
in to the 'Ireasury and money that is first paid in and then taken back
out" (p

87).

And that bias gives tax preferences "greater political ap

peal" than would the same subsidy in the form of a direct expenditure
(id).

But even

example,

if

if that is

so, the normative implication is unclear. For

policy experts were to conclude on substantive grounds

that a given subsidy-a given preference for one kind of investment

over another-would be welfare enhancing, perhaps structuring the

proposal in the form of a tax preference (rather than as a direct ex
penditure) would be desirable, precisely because of the endowment

effect, precisely because it would minimize taxpayer opposition and

maximize the odds of getting the change adopted.

Granted, such use of a cognitive psychology/public choice argu

ment is cynical. But that is the nature of such arguments, and I did not

start it. Moreover, at least in this case, the policy experts could be

forthright with policymakers (if not with taxpayers) about the reason

for choosing the tax code as the location for the preference. Of course,

if

the word got back to taxpayers that a trick was being played on

them, the endowment effect might be lost. But if the tax-preference
endowment effect were so easily eliminated, then Shaviro's objection

to tax preferences in the first place would lose a great deal of its force.
In that case, we could simply start by explaining to taxpayers the

equivalence of tax expenditures and direct expenditures and be done
with it.
Does my anti-tax-exceptionalism argument imply that we should

reject the CTB norm and Shaviro's public choice concerns about tax
preferences? Of course not. Those concerns are valid. They provide
ample reason to be skeptical of any tax preference (putting aside for

now the difficulty of defining a tax preference). My point, however, is

that such concerns also provide ample reason to be skeptical of any
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governmental preferences, which means the public choice problem
could be a much larger one than Shaviro's tax exceptionalism sug
gests.
Having said all of this, I, for one, am not yet sufficiently skeptical
of the legislative lawmaking process to endorse a transition policy that
would undermine lawmakers' ability ever to use tax (or, taken to the
extreme, nontax) preferences in the future.61 And, apparently, neither
is Shaviro. Indeed, his bottom line transition proposal for tax prefer
ences-including (critically) his endorsement of the ANR norm as

applied to tax-preference repeals-strikes me as a sensible middle po

sition. Under such a rule, although many types of tax preferences
would be discouraged (because of the default-premium effect dis
cussed in Part LC above),

if Congress nevertheless

determines that a

tax preference is called for, the use of various "up front" tax subsidies
would continue to provide a default-premium-minimizing option for
lawmakers.62
Of course, from the perspective of the radical CTBer, the worry
would be that, under Shaviro's proposal, the availability of transition
protected up front tax subsidies is just another loophole that needs to
be sl ammed shut. Fortunately, from the anti-opportunism perspective,
the ANR norm appears to be safe, for now.

61 Part of my unwillingness to eliminate tax and nontax preferences from lawmakers' pol
icy toolbox is that I still tend to hold a somewhat optimistic view of policymaking in the long run.
For a similar sentiment, with respect to lawmaking generally, see Levmore, 99 Colum L Rev at
1662 (cited in note 11) ("In short, although there is an endless stream of pessimistic arguments
about the likely character of laws, there may be a comparable-less f amiliar but perhaps supe
rior-set of optimistic arguments supporting the idea that most new law is good law.").
62 "Up front" subsidies include credits or deductions all or most of whose benefits are con
centrated in the first year of investment and thus for which an ANR norm provides almost full
transition-loss protection. See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1192-94 (cited in note 4); Kaplow, 99
Harv L Rev at 587 (cited in note 3). See also Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: Onetime vs. Peri
odic: An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 Tax L Rev 305, 309-12 (1994).

